Iran War Has Cost Nearly $2,000 Per US Household: Moody's Top Economist

Moody's Analytics chief economist Mark Zandi estimated Oct. 12 that the Iran war has cost the average U.S. household nearly $2,000 since it began, or about $265 billion nationwide. He put roughly $1,100 per household on higher energy and transportation costs, $540 on higher interest rates and $360 on military spending, and said the energy tab is still rising by about $50 per household each week at current fuel prices.

An MH-60R Sea Hawk helicopter, assigned to Helicopter Maritime Strike Squadron 50, takes off from the flight deck of the Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Thomas Hudner on May 4, 2026. US NAVY/AFP via Getty Images

Zandi wrote on X: "Consider that the war's costs taken together have absorbed about half the average American household's income gain over the past eight months. No wonder the war is so unpopular."

White House Principal Deputy Press Secretary Anna Kelly answered in a statement: "Mark Zandi is a Democrat donor who is frequently wrong - including predicting multiple recessions that never happened." She added: "President Trump is rightfully ensuring that Iran, a country that for 47 years chanted 'Death to America,' can never have a nuclear weapon." U.S. and Israeli strikes on Iran began Feb. 28.

Consider that the war’s costs taken together have absorbed about half the average American household’s income gain over the past eight months. No wonder the war is so unpopular.

— Mark Zandi (@Markzandi) October 12, 2026

Zandi's number is a broad economic estimate, not a federal outlay. Brown University puts consumer costs at $133.3 billion, about $1,018 per household, and Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth has testified to about $37.5 billion in direct military costs, Newsweek reported. ZH has tracked estimates running well above the White House's.

As the Epoch Times notes further, "Higher energy prices are contributing most to the costs," Zandi said. "A gallon of regular goes for $4.37, up from just under $3 before the war. Diesel is above $6, and jet fuel has nearly doubled. As winter approaches, the much higher price of home heating fuel is also adding to the costs."

Zandi said the war's inflation contributed to the Fed's decision last month to raise rates and signal that more rate increases are coming.

"Long-term rates are also up a lot - fixed mortgage rates have climbed from below 6 percent before the war to 7.5 percent. By our reckoning, the higher rates have cost the economy about $540 per household," he said.

In September, the Congressional Budget Office estimated the war cost the U.S. military $38.1 billion through Aug. 1. With fighting expected to continue, the war was estimated to cost between $2 billion and $3 billion each month, depending on its intensity.

On Oct. 5, the Congressional Research Service published a report listing some of the major equipment losses during the war.

The report listed 81 fixed-wing or rotary-wing aircraft, including drones that were lost or damaged during the conflict.

The Congressional Budget Office estimated the cost of equipment losses as of Aug. 1 to be between $1.9 billion and $3.3 billion, depending on the Department of War's plans for replacement.

Democrats have continually pointed to the cost of the war in their criticism of Trump.

In September, 46 Democratic or left-leaning Independent Senators sent a letter to Department of War Secretary Pete Hegseth demanding more information on the costs of the war.

Tyler Durden Thu, 10/15/2026 - 15:35
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Iran War Has Cost Nearly $2,000 Per US Household: Moody's Top Economist

Dowd: "Investment Bubbles Are A Feature Of Capitalism, Not A Bug"

Authored by Ed Dowd via Ed Dowd's Beyond The Narrative Substack,

On Friday October 9th Bloomberg published an article titled "Jeffries' Chris Wood Sees 'Massive Capital Destruction' in AI." His view is that the most likely long-term outcome of the AI boom is massive capital destruction in the US, with market share shifting to cheaper open-source Chinese models. Wood has mostly got it right in my opinion except for two differences. My first difference is that Chinese models are not the only open-source models available and that western open-source models are closing the gap. Secondly, while his view correctly flags the overbuild and the competitive pressure from lower-cost alternatives what it leaves out is the long history of innovative technology infrastructure bubbles and the reliable pattern that follows them which is:

excitement/mania → overinvestment → financial collapse → distressed assets → recapitalized cheap infrastructure fuels the next economic wave.

In regard to the AI bubble, I believe we are currently in the overinvestment phase with cracks emerging. Let us look at some historical examples to illustrate the pattern and see if we can glean what the future of this current bubble might look like.

The US Railroad Bubble

In the decades after the Civil War, railroads became the transformative technology of the era. Capital, much of it European, flooded in. Between the late 1860s and early 1870s, tens of thousands of miles of track were laid, often into sparsely settled or unprofitable territory. Speculative financing, land grants, and the expectation of endless growth created a classic mania. Early projects showed strong returns, which attracted more money into later, riskier lines built far ahead of demand. When financing dried up, highlighted by the failure of Jay Cooke's bank in marketing Northern Pacific bonds, the Panic of 1873 followed. More than 100 railroads went bankrupt in the ensuing years, banks failed, and investors were wiped out. The depression lasted years. Yet the physical tracks remained. The surviving and reorganized network became the backbone of American industrial expansion, enabling efficient movement of goods, people, and capital that powered decades of growth. The overbuilt infrastructure, once distressed and recapitalized, proved far more valuable to the broader economy than the paper losses suggested.

The 1920s Utility Bubble

The 1920s electrification boom followed a similar script. Central-station utilities expanded rapidly, and holding companies consolidated regional systems into large, leveraged empires. Electricity generation and revenues grew dramatically as the technology moved from novelty to infrastructure. Utility stocks soared and became a major part of the market. Holding companies facilitated access to capital and technical expertise, but the structures were opaque, and capacity was built aggressively. The 1929 crash and subsequent Depression exposed the leverage and accounting. Samuel Insull's empire collapsed in spectacular fashion, and the Dow Jones Utilities Average plunged. Reforms including the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 broke up the largest structures and shifted the industry toward regulated regional monopolies. What remained was a vastly expanded electrical grid and generation capacity. Widespread electrification transformed industry, homes, and productivity for the rest of the century. The bust was painful for equity and debt holders; the long-term economic payoff from cheap, abundant power was enormous.

The Dotcom Bubble

The most recent and directly analogous example is the late 1990s telecom fiber buildout during the Dotcom era. Carriers and infrastructure firms poured hundreds of billions into fiber-optic networks, switches, and related equipment, largely financed with debt and encouraged by forecasts of internet traffic doubling every few months. Capacity vastly exceeded near-term demand. After the bubble burst, market values collapsed, many telecoms went bankrupt, and bandwidth prices fell sharply. A large portion of the newly laid fiber sat "dark" or unlit. Through bankruptcies and recapitalizations, that physical infrastructure was acquired at deep discounts, often pennies on the dollar. The resulting cheap broadband made business models viable that would have been prohibitively expensive otherwise. Google, YouTube, Facebook, Apple's smartphone ecosystem, Netflix, software-as-a-service, and cloud services all scaled on that excess capacity. Without the overbuilding and subsequent distress, Web 2.0 as we know it does not happen at the same speed or cost. The capital destruction was real but the residual infrastructure seeded the next wave of growth.

AI Bubble (Yes it is a bubble!)

I believe we are now in the AI infrastructure equivalent of the overinvestment phase. Massive capital is flowing into data centers, chips, power, and related equipment. The sheer scale of spending is turning advanced AI models into a commodity faster than many equity and debt investors appear to appreciate. Chinese open-source models are already applying downward pricing pressure, consistent with the Jefferies view. Cracks are visible. In my Substack piece "Wall Street's AI Capex Party...It's 2 AM & The Bar Is About to Close!", the signals included stalled private credit funding for the buildout, cracking enterprise demand as promised productivity gains fail to materialize at scale, looming power constraints that are becoming the binding limit rather than chip supply, and open-source pricing pressure that compresses margins.

Additional recent indicators from public commentary reinforce this: circular deals in which AI companies run negative free cash flow and rely on debt investors to keep purchasing chips at elevated prices; recent analyses showing major players cannot cover contracted compute commitments under realistic revenue assumptions; and narrative shifts such as space based data centers that paper over terrestrial grid and power bottlenecks. Growth rates implied by current valuations look vulnerable once the second derivative of funding and utilization slows. It is not a question of not if the bubble bursts but when it bursts.

Credit Markets Always End Infrastructure Buildouts

Debt and credit have been central to every one of these infrastructure buildouts. In the railroad boom, bonds financed the majority of the expansion, often more than three-quarters of the capital. When those markets stopped absorbing new bond issues (e.g. Jay Cooke & Co. could no longer place Northern Pacific bonds) the credit system seized up. Then bank runs followed, the New York Stock Exchange closed for ten days, and within two years roughly a third of outstanding railroad bonds had stopped paying interest. The equity markets lagged in this period...credit markets ended the railroad party abruptly.

The 1920s utility expansion followed the same pattern on a different scale. Samuel Insull's holding company pyramid relied on layers of debt and bank loans secured by the securities of the operating companies themselves (financial engineering). Once revenues softened and the banks refused to roll the notes in 1932, the structure collapsed into receivership. In this period the equity markets led the credit markets first with the 1929 crash then credit followed later.

In the telecom fiber boom, carriers raised hundreds of billions in bonds and used vendor financing and circular deals to keep the buildout going. Credit markets ultimately marked the end of the buildout but equities peaked in March of 2000 before credit. Credit spreads later widened sharply in 2001 and 2002, defaults clustered in the sector for years, and bondholders recovered roughly twenty cents on the dollar in many cases. When lenders stopped funding incremental capacity, the overinvestment phase ended and the financial collapse began.

The same dynamic is now visible in the AI buildout, where private credit has stalled, circular debt structures are proliferating, off balance sheet financing is growing and early signs of stress are appearing in CCC junk credit markets. Whether equity markets lead or lag this cycle remains to be seen but the case could be made that given the tremendous amount of passive equity investing the discounting mechanism of equity could lag and credit leads this time.

Bottom Line

Innovative technology capex cycles repeat themselves because human nature has not changed. Mania and excitement give way to overinvestment, which produces financial collapse and distressed assets. Those assets then become the cheap foundation for the next economic wave. Those who believe in cycles and a constant human nature may want to protect themselves accordingly and reduce exposure in the AI complex where risk-reward no longer makes sense. Then when the bust does arrive watch for the opportunities that emerge from the ashes where durable longer-term value will be created.

Bubbles are a feature of capitalism, not a bug. They destroy capital in the short run and, through the process of overbuilding and recapitalization, often leave behind the physical and technical foundation for longer-term productivity gains. The pattern is consistent throughout history...though the timing and severity may vary. The long-term outcome for the economy is usually more favorable than the peak-to-trough equity charts imply and a net positive over time.

"What has been will be again, what has been done will be done again; there is nothing new under the sun." Ecclesiastes 1:9

Tyler Durden Wed, 10/14/2026 - 15:20
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Dowd: "Investment Bubbles Are A Feature Of Capitalism, Not A Bug"

Big Tech Pushes Back On Paying For A Grid That Was Crumbling Long Before AI

When Big Tech signed President Trump's Ratepayer Protection Pledge in March, promising to pay for all the new grid infrastructure upgrades required to service their data centers, we cautioned that "voluntary pledges from trillion-dollar tech giants have a habit of evolving."

Seven months later, the hyperscalers are pushing back on how much of the grid's bill is theirs to pay.

The past week brought a Democratic Senate report and a North Carolina utility settlement, and FERC is expected to rule on whether new data centers must bring their own power.

But before anyone grabs a pitchfork, ask the question none of them answers: how much of this bill is really AI's, and how much is the cost of decades of grid neglect?

On Friday, Senators Elizabeth Warren, Chris Van Hollen and Richard Blumenthal released Power and Profits, the result of a nearly yearlong investigation into seven data center operators including Amazon, Google, Meta and Microsoft. The headline finding is as you would expect: the companies' promises to cover their full costs apply to infrastructure serving only their own facilities, not the full cost of shared grid upgrades their arrival triggers.

The companies broadly opposed the "but-for" standard consumer advocates are pushing, under which a data center pays for any shared upgrade that "would not have been built but for the data center." One hyperscaler told Senate staff that such upgrades often provide a "system benefit which should be shared among all ratepayers."

They also balked at minimum bills, which advocates want set at 80% to 90% of contracted demand whether the power gets used or not. One Big Tech firm called a 90% floor "insanely high." Another called 85% to 90% "unreasonably high," since facilities often don't use all of their projected demand.

Two days earlier, Duke Energy announced a settlement, signed by Amazon, Google, Meta, Microsoft and North Carolina's utility consumer advocate, that it says ensures data centers "will pay upfront for all costs to connect to the grid."

The settlement itself is more nuanced. Data centers prepay the full cost of equipment that serves only them, such as a dedicated substation. For shared transmission upgrades, they post a letter of credit covering the estimated cost, collateral that starts shrinking once the facility consistently draws 75% of its contracted demand.

Whether data centers get directly charged for any slice of those shared costs is punted to a Duke study due a year after approval, and would apply only to future contracts.

Bring Your Own Power... Or Else

Then there's PJM, which wants new data centers of 50 MW or more, starting in June 2027, to bring their own new capacity or be first in line to be cut off when the grid is strained.

PJM asked FERC to sign off by October 12. The Data Center Coalition urged FERC to reject the plan, and Google, which just contracted for 890 MW of new nuclear uprates from Constellation, has warned it would "chill investment."

With Goldman now expecting behind-the-meter power to supply a quarter of all data centers by 2030, more of them may decide that building their own plants beats arguing over the grid's bill.

"But For" What, Exactly?

The but-for test only works if everyone agrees on what the grid would have needed anyway, and the senators' own report suggests that is quite a lot. Tucked into its opening pages is an admission that roughly a third of US transmission and half of distribution infrastructure is operating "near or beyond its useful life." Nowhere does it estimate how much of that needed replacing with or without AI.

No case makes the point better than Three Mile Island. As we reported in March, Constellation's restart of Unit 1, a reactor that fed this same grid until 2019, ran into a "four-year-tall roadblock" when PJM said full deliverability could take until 2031.

Full output hinges on 765-kV and 500-kV transmission upgrades not expected until December 2030, and Constellation needed a FERC waiver to shift 760 MW of interconnection rights from its Eddystone plant just to try to work around them.

A reactor that can't fully reconnect to a grid it was plugged into seven years ago is a grid problem, not a data center problem. 

None of this means the hyperscalers deserve a free ride. They signed the pledge, and they should honor it. But "but for the data center" is doing a lot of heavy lifting for a grid that, by the senators' own account, was already wearing out.

Then again, sending Big Tech the bill is a lot easier than explaining why the grid was falling apart before anyone had heard of ChatGPT.
 

Tyler Durden Tue, 10/13/2026 - 15:25
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Big Tech Pushes Back On Paying For A Grid That Was Crumbling Long Before AI

BofA Bets On Copper And Uranium As Higher Rates Put Gold Under Pressure

Bank of America metals and mining analyst Lawson Winder shared his latest outlook for the space in a Friday note titled, "We like copper and uranium, while rates should keep a lid on gold prices."

Winder said his desk favors copper and uranium producers as global supply constraints collide with soaring power-grid demand, supporting higher prices for these commodities. He pointed out that higher US interest rates should keep the dollar bid while weighing on gold.

On single stocks, BofA downgraded Kinross Gold to Underperform and Alamos Gold to Neutral. Freeport-McMoRan remains BofA's top copper stock, while Cameco is its top uranium pick.

For base metals, Winder said copper is the strongest industrial metal. He said constrained supply and long-term electrification demand support higher prices. His desk raised its 2026 average copper forecast by 3% to $13,278 a ton and increased its long-term estimate by 20% to $13,578, adding that prices could average $15,250 in 2027.

He lifted his Freeport price target to $87 from $80, citing progress in the Grasberg operational turnaround and prospects for production growth.

Uranium is another favorite for BofA analysts, even though they cut their 2026 average estimate for the radioactive metal used in nuclear fuel rods to about $97 a pound. They maintained their 2027 projection near $130, roughly 45% above the spot price cited in the report.

Cameco offers one of the top exposures to both uranium prices and nuclear buildout through its 49% stake in Westinghouse, the analyst said. He maintained his "Buy" rating and a $133 price target on one of the world's largest providers of uranium fuel for clean nuclear power.

Here's the full list of precious metals, industrial and base metals, and steel stocks in Winder's coverage universe:

Extended explanation of the coverage universe:

Agnico Eagle Mines (AEM)

Our $233 per share price objective is based on Agnico Eagle trading at 2.00x times our estimated NAV (current net debt position plus a mining asset DCF utilizing a 5% WACC). Historically, North American gold producers have traded between 1 and 2 times NAV, with 1.75-2.0 times being accorded to the organically growth-oriented gold producers such as AEM.

Risks of this price objective not being attained are commodity price weakness, the inability to secure financing for expansion or development projects, unforeseen operating problems, and political risk in the countries the company operates in. Upside risks are commodity price strength, better-than-forecast operating performance and favorable changes in the political environment in the regions where it operates.

Alamos Gold (YAGI / AGI)

Our price objective for Alamos Gold (AGI/YAGI) is US$36.00/C$51.00, based on the stock trading at 1.00x our estimated net asset value (NAV) and a 1.42 CADUSD FX rate. Historically, North American precious metal producers have traded between 1x and 3x NAV but more recently between 1x and 2x, with unhedged, growth-oriented producers occupying the upper end of the range and Junior and Mid-tier producers trading historically at a discount to the senior producers.

Upside risks to our PO are a higher-than-forecast gold price, a lower-than-forecast CADUSD FX rate, exploration success at Island, Mulatos and Young-Davidson, better-than-expected synergies at Magino, advantageous changes to the regulatory and/or tax regimes in the jurisdictions in which they operate, and the potential for AGI to be acquired at a premium valuation.

Downside risks are a lower-than-forecast gold price and higher-than-forecast CADUSD FX rate, risks of the Argonaut transaction not receiving regulatory approval, operational challenges with the Magino mine, risks associated with undertaken M&A (such as with respect to integration of assets), and unforeseen operating and development issues at other assets.

Alcoa Corporation (AA)

Our price objective of $48.00 for AA is based on 4.0x 2026E EV/EBITDA, 3.5x 2027E EV/EBITDA and 1.0x net asset value (NAV), with each value equally weighted. The 4.0x 2026E EV/EBITDA target multiple is below the lower end of the global aluminum producer peer average of 4-5x due to our more bearish outlook for alumina from the BofA Global Research Commodities team as well as continued overhang related to Section 232 tariffs, San Ciprian/Alumar restart and Western Australia bauxite permits. The 3.0x is also below AA's historical trading average (since 2016 separation) of 5x. The 3.5x 2027E EV/EBITDA multiple is lower than the 2026E multiple to account for time value. The 1.0x price to NAV (P/NAV) target multiple is in line with our broad NA metals and mining coverage.

Downside risks to our price objective are 1) aluminum price weakness, 2) extended delays in getting its bauxite mine approvals in Western Australia, 3) pension liabilities, 4) higher raw materials costs including electricity, oil, caustic soda, coke, and pitch, 5) power contract negotiation risk (electricity is a large cost component), 6) power disruption risk and other unforeseen weather-related risks, 7) political, regulatory and country risks, 8) unfavorable currency changes including in the BRL, CAD, EUR, ISK and NOK, and 9) the removal of protective tariffs in markets.

Upside risks to our price objective are 1) higher aluminum prices, 2) better-than-expected cost containment, and 3) global demand growth.

Almonty Industries Inc (ALM)

Our $24 price objective (PO) is based on 8.0x 2027E EV/EBITDA, 7.5x 2028E EV/EBITDA, and 1.0x P/NAV. We think the target multiples are conservative as they are discounted to critical mineral stocks that trade around 25x 2026E EV/EBITDA. At 8.0x 2027E EV/EBITDA, our target multiple would be in-line with historical trading average of the copper stocks (which we consider more industrial metal stocks but have some elements of critical mineral stocks), and a substantial discount to the current 25x trading multiple of the critical mineral stocks). Our 7.5x 2028E EV/EBITDA target multiple is a standardized (0.5x) discount to 2027E to account time value risk. While our 1.0x P/NAV target multiple is typical for copper and critical mineral stocks, it does reflect a substantial discount to where both groups are now trading.

Upside risks to our PO are higher than expected tungsten prices (whether accelerating demand or continued supply challenges), weaker local currencies than expected that reduce USD operating costs (i.e. EUR, KRW), the build-out of key projects that are not included in our current forecasts (Los Santos, Valtreixal, Gentung), and the potential for ALM to become the subject of an acquisition.

Downside risks to our PO are lower than expected tungsten prices (whether slowing demand or greater than expected supply), stronger local currencies than expected that increase USD operating costs (i.e. the EUR and KRW), and operational challenges.

Aura Minerals (AUGO / XEDTA)

Our price objective for Aura Minerals is US$101.00 and R$169.00 per share, and is based on the stock trading at 1.35 times our estimated net asset value (NAV). Our NAV is based on a 5% discount rate and a long-term gold price of $3,500/oz. In recent history, North American precious metal stocks have traded between 1 and 2 times NAV, with unhedged, growth-oriented producers with solid balance sheets occupying the upper end of the range. Our 1.35x NAV for AUGO is at a premium to the average of Intermediate/Junior (Jr) peers in our coverage to recognize its peer leading production growth profile.

Upside risks to our price objective are stronger-than-forecast commodity prices, lower than expected costs, positive regulatory, permitting or operating developments and significant success in exploration.

Downside risks to our price objective are unforeseen operating problems, political, legal or permitting challenges in the regions in which the company operates, rising capital and operating costs, and delays in the development of its growth projects.

FX and controlling shareholder influence could be risks in either direction.

B2Gold Corp (YBTO / BTG)

Our price objective for B2Gold (BTG/YBTO) is US$3.75/C$5.25 based on the stock trading at 0.75x our estimated net asset value (NAV). Historically, North American precious metal stocks have traded between 1.0x and 3.0x NAV and between 1.0x and 2.0x more recently with a median of 1.25-1.50 times, with unhedged, growth-oriented producers occupying the upper end of the range. We use a 0.75x NAV multiple for BTG vs. mid-tier gold producer peers' target multiples at 0.75x-1.25x given higher execution risk.

Downside risks to our BTG valuation are: 1) political risk from Mali 2) mine plan estimates in excess of BTG reserves, 3) lack of commodity diversification, 4) mine plans that are based on outstanding permits or approvals, 5) unfavorable changes in currencies, 6) unforeseen increases in in put costs such as the price of oil and labor, 7) the possibility it could lose its social license to operate at any of its mines or projects 8) potential cuts to the dividend or reduced capital return and 9) issues with the ongoing construction and ramp-up of the Goose project. Upside risks are a higher gold price, the possibility for BTG to be acquired and unexpected exploration success. 10) Our gold price forecast is also a risk to our BTG valuation/forecasts.

Barrick Mining (B)

Our price objective (PO) for Barrick Gold is $58.00 per share and is based on the stock trading at 1.25x our estimated net asset value (NAV). Historically, North American precious metal stocks have traded between 1 and 3 times NAV, with unhedged, growth-oriented producers with assets located in relatively geopolitically stable regions occupying the upper end of the range. Preventing us from assigning a higher target P/NAV multiple is Barrick's stable gold output. Downside risks to our price objective are: commodity price weakness, the inability to secure financing for expansion or development projects, unforeseen operating problems, political or legal challenges in the regions in which the company operates, rising capital and operating costs and delays in the development of its growth projects. Upside risks are stronger than expected commodity prices, better than expected production and cost control.

Cameco Corporation (YCCO / CCJ)

Our C$190 ($133) PO is based on 1.0x our NAV and 35.0x 2026E & 34.5x 2027E EV/EBITDA (all 3 equally weighted). We use a CADUSD FX rate of 1.42. The 35.0x 2026E EV/EBITDA is above its long-term average of c.15x, but below the long-term peak of c.40.0x that occurred when nuclear energy growth was last very strong. The 34.5x for 2027E is a slight discount to 35.0x used for 2026E given time-related risk. The 1.0x P/NAV is above the longer-term average of c.0.9x but below peak of 1.35x. We think 1.0x is justified given Cameco's world-class tier one assets in favorable jurisdictions (Canada) & potential exploration upside partially offset by voluntary idling of one of those tier-one assets (but is in the process of restarting).

Downside risks: 1) slower-than-expected global energy demand growth, 2) continued push-out of a Japanese nuclear fleet restart, 3) any worsening in sentiment toward nuclear or more favorable sentiment toward alternative power fuel sources, and 4) any production problems at Cameco's only operating mine, Cigar Lake.

Upside risks: 1) additional potential mine disruptions that may further improve supply-demand dynamics, 2) better pace of reactor development in key future demand countries (China, Japan, and India), 3) more stringent carbon emissions restrictions in key countries, encouraging nuclear power as an environmentally friendly base line energy source, 4) a material rise in natural gas prices making nuclear power generation competitive in the US.

Centerra Gold (YCG / CGAU)

Our price objective for Centerra Gold is C$22.75 per share and US$16.00 per share, based on the stock trading at 0.75x our estimated net asset value (NAV). Historically North American precious metal stocks have traded between 1 and 3 times NAV, with a median of 1.50 times over the past nine years (and 2.00 times longer-term), with unhedged, growth-oriented producers occupying the upper end of the range.

Downside risks to our price objective for Centerra Gold are commodity price weakness, delays in the development of its growth projects and the potential for additional operating issues at Öksüt. Upside risks to our price objective are gold and molybdenum prices rising, unexpected exploration success at any of the assets, and a favorable renegotiation of its gold/copper stream on Mt. Milligan.

Centrus Energy Corp. (LEU)

Our price objective (PO) of $167 per share is derived based on 2.5x our estimated net asset value (NAV). The 2.5x 2026E NAV target multiple is a premium to the nuclear fuel supply peers to account for barriers to entry, its emerging next generation nuclear fuel growth business, strong enrichment market fundamentals to which its peers have minimal exposure, and U.S. government support, that is now being realized via the early 2026, $900m DoE funding award.

Downside risks are:1) lower than forecast enrichment pricing, 2) loss of access to enriched uranium product, 3) unexpected restrictive regulatory changes, possibly including sanctions, 4) shipping disruptions, and 5) technical disruptions.

Upside risks are: 1) higher than forecast enrichment pricing, 2) unexpected government financial and/or regulatory support, 3) a potential acquisition, and 4) faster than expected deployments of small and advanced modular reactors.

Cleveland-Cliffs (CLF)

Our $14.00 PO is based on 7.0x 2026E EV/EBITDA, 6.5x 2027E EV/EBITDA and 1.0x net asset value, with each value equally weighted. The 7.0x 2026E EV/EBITDA target multiple is higher than its historical trading average of 7.4x and is more in line with that of its key steel peers given an emerging recovery in US auto production and CLF's substantial automotive exposure relative to public peers.

Downside risks: 1) new capacities pressuring steel prices & margins, 2) obsolescence of its capacity relative to newer supply forcing closures, 3) higher-than-expected capex or interrupted operations to address older mills or environmental liabilities, 4) union representation may keep labor costs high relative to peers, 5) underfunded pension/health care position & high leverage, 6) risks to auto sector demand, including switching to aluminum & alternative materials, 7) higher imports and/or, 8) changes to trade policy.

Upside risks: 1) better steel demand than we anticipate, 2) steel price outperformance, especially if driven by raw materials as CLF is largely vertically integrated, 3) Further reduction in underfunded pension & OPEB liability, 4) resumption of the dividend, 5) better auto negotiating position for longer, and 6) sustained/higher barriers to imported steel. 6) More earnings accretion from agreement with major global steel producer.

CMC (CMC)

Our $78 per share price objective for Commercial Metals (CMC) is based on a blended 6.5x FY26E EV/EBITDA, 6.0x FY27E EV/EBITDA and 1.0x our NAV. The 6.5x 2026E EV/EBITDA target multiple is higher than its historical trading average of 6.1x to reflect the market rerating. However, the 6.5x multiple is below the target multiples used for other mini-mill peers (7.5x-8.0x) given its less diverse products / end-markets. This is partly offset by CMC's leverage to infrastructure (which is set to see strong growth from a significant increase in federal spending) and reshoring demand.

Upside risks to our price objective are: 1) better-than-expected construction / reshoring demand, 2) higher steel pricing, 3) better-than-expected pricing power in global long products that support pricing and limit imports, 4) additional trade relief, 5) cash deployment for organic or inorganic growth.

Downside risks to our price objective are: 1) sluggish demand due to delay in federal funding and/or tightened credit availability for private projects, 2) lower steel pricing, 3) execution risk related to Tensar and new micro-mills, 4) any rollback of trade relief, particularly related to Section 232, 5) threat of lower priced imports and 6) potential medium term oversupply from various new entrants in the domestic rebar market.

Eldorado Gold (EGO / YELD)

Our price objective of $51.00 (C$72.00) is based on the stock trading at 1.25x times its estimated net asset value (NAV). Historically, North American precious metal stocks have traded between 1 and 3 times NAV over the last five years, with a median of 1.50 times (and 2.00 times longer-term) and with unhedged, growth-oriented producers occupying the upper end of the range. We value EGO below the lower end of the valuation range due to higher political risk for operating in Greece and Türkiye.

Downside risks to our price objective for Eldorado Gold are commodity price weakness, the inability to secure financing for expansion or development projects, unforeseen operating problems, political, legal or permitting challenges in the regions in which the company operates, rising capital and operating costs and delays in the development of its growth projects.

Upside risks are a higher-than-expected gold price, a more hospitable regulatory environment in the jurisdictions where the company operates (in particular, Greece), more favorable foreign exchange rates than now projected, and better-than-expected operational results.

First Quantum Minerals (YFM / FQVLF)

Our C$44.00 and US$31.00 price objectives are based on a 9.5x 2026E EV/EBITDA, 9.0x 2027E EV/EBITDA, and 1.00x our NAV estimate, reflecting the long-term value of the suspended Cobre Panamá mine (we assume mine restarts in late-2027E) and the steps taken to strengthen the balance sheet.

Upside risks are stronger than forecast copper prices, early resumption of FM's development projects (Cobre Panamá), favorable local currency changes that lower USD costs, and the potential for First Quantum to become an acquisition target.

Downside risks to our PO are a weaker-than-expected global economy that could impede metal demand growth expectations, affecting our commodity price forecasts. In addition, sovereign risks in Zambia (i.e., challenging geopolitical environment, developing infrastructure) and Panamá (mining a newer industry), ramp-up issues at Cobre Panamá, stronger than forecast local currencies that increase USD costs, labor action, and weather could also impact our FM valuation and PO.

Franco-Nevada (YFNV / FNV)

Our price objective for Franco-Nevada is C$398 (US$280) per share, based on the stock trading at 2.65x our estimated net asset value (NAV) on a cash-adjusted basis and a USD/CAD FX rate of 1.42x. Historically, North American precious metal streaming stocks have traded between 1.50 and 3.50 times NAV, with growth oriented streaming companies at the top end. Based on its strong balance sheet and low-cost asset base, we believe Franco-Nevada deserves a premium multiple. Franco-Nevada also benefits from an experienced management team.

Upside risks to our PO are substantially higher commodity prices, higher-than-expected output at the royalty assets, and/or higher reserves.

Downside risks are commodity price weakness and unforeseen operating problems at the mines on which its royalties are based.

Freeport-McMoRan (FCX)

Our $87.00 per share price objective blends 11x 2026E, 10.5x 2027E EV/EBITDA and 1.0x our net asset value (NAV). The EV/EBITDA target multiples are above the 8.0x historical average for copper producers covered by BofA Global Research to reflect the impact from temporary lower volumes at Grasberg and our bullish view for Copper. Our P/NAV multiple of 1.0x is in line with most of the copper producers covered by BofA Global Research but is arguably conservative given several potentially value-enhancing growth options that we do not currently model. These include a new mill at El Abra, a mill expansion at Bagdad and low-grade leaching.

Downside risks to our price objective are 1) global economic weakness, 2) Operating disruptions, 3) execution risk at its cost-cutting or expansion programs, 4) stricter or unfavorable regulatory or environmental regulations, particularly at its Indonesian operations, 5) other factors pressuring prices of the commodities it produces and 6) unfavorable currency moves.

Upside risks are 1) better-than-expected copper and gold prices, 2) a more accommodating operating environment in Indonesia and 3) further cost-cutting progress.

Hudbay Minerals (YHBM / HBM)

Our C$45.50 (US$32.00) per share price objective for Hudbay Minerals (YHBM/HBM) is based on a 8.5x 2026E EV/EBITDA multiple, 8.0x 2027E EV/EBITDA multiple and 1.0x our net asset (NAV) estimate, weighted equally to each. Since 2005, the global copper producers have traded in an EV/EBITDA range from 2.0x to 13.0x with HBM trading at a discount. For HBM, we use a below peer target multiple given a less diverse asset base than average (just two copper mines and one gold mine) partly offset by stronger average jurisdictional exposure.

Upside risks are stronger-than-forecast copper prices, favorable local currency changes that lower USD costs, the receipt of all permits for Rosemont with no legal challenges, a sooner than expected start of mining of the Pampacancha satellite deposit and the potential for HBM to be targeted for acquisition.

A downside risk to our PO is a weaker-than-expected global economy that could impede metal demand growth expectations, affecting our commodity price forecasts. Other downside risks are a delay in attaining surface access rights at Pampacancha, the political and regulatory climate in the jurisdictions in which HBM operates (Canada, Peru and the USA), stronger than forecast local currencies that increase USD costs, increases in general operating and development costs, labor action, weather and the inability to attain the needed permits to develop Rosemont, M&A risk.

IAMGOLD Corp. (IAG / YIMG)

Our price objective for IAMGOLD is US$22.00/C$31.50 per share, and is based on the stock trading at 1.35x times our estimated net asset value (NAV) and a 1.42 CADUSD exchange rate. Historically, North American precious metal stocks have traded between 1.50 and 3 times NAV, with a median of 2.00 times over the long-term, and with unhedged, growth-oriented producers with solid financial positions and low relative costs and located in stable mining jurisdiction occupying the upper end of the range. We ascribe a moderate P/NAV multiple to IAMGOLD to reflect our forecast for higher than average political risk in Burkina Faso, execution risks at the Cote Gold project, and higher cash costs and debt vs. peers. As the Cote Gold project in Canada ramp-ups, this should drive strong volume growth, lower costs and political risk, and ultimately drive deleveraging.

Upside risks: Gold price could surprise to the upside vs. our expectation. Potential positive developments in terms of exploration results and project execution.

Downside risks: Gold price could surprise to the downside vs. our expectations. Risks on project capital cost over-runs / schedule disappointment. We also consider the risk for unfavorable political developments, particularly in higher perceived political risk jurisdictions such as Burkina Faso.

Ivanhoe Mines (YIVN / IVPAF)

Our C$13.50 (US$14.50) price objective is based on 1.10x our net asset (NAV) estimate. The 1.10x price to net asset value (P/NAV) target multiple is at a modest premium to the current trading multiples of global copper producers to reflect its superior production growth, low relative unit costs, a strong balance sheet and solid copper optionality with the 100%-owned Western Foreland property.

Upside risks to our PO are stronger-than-forecast copper prices, faster-than-expected ramp-up of IVN's development projects (in particular, Kamoa-Kakula), the discovery of new mineral resources that become mining projects (Western Foreland has this potential), favorable local currency changes that lower USD costs, participation in the M&A backdrop

Downside risks to our PO are a weaker-than-expected global economy, jurisdictional risks in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and South Africa (i.e., tax regime changes, mining policy shifts, poorly defined legal frameworks, difficulty in obtaining social license, etc.), ramp-up issues at Kamoa-Kakula, input cost inflation, stronger-than-forecast local currencies that increase USD costs, labor action, and weather.

Kinross Gold (KGC)

Our price objective for Kinross Gold is $24.75 per share, and is based on the stock trading at 1.25 times our net asset value (NAV) estimate, reflecting production growth that is forecast to be slightly lower than the senior/mid-tier average. Historically, North American precious metal stocks have traded between 1 and 3 times NAV, with companies with declining production at the lower end of the range.

Risks to our price objective for Kinross Gold are commodity price weakness, the inability to secure financing for expansion or development projects, unforeseen operating problems, political or legal challenges in the regions in which the company operates, rising capital and operating costs and delays in the development of its growth projects or current mine expansions. On the upside, risks are stronger than expected commodity prices and an operating turnaround that exceeds our expectations in terms of timing and magnitude, and exploration success.

Lundin Mining Corp (YLUN / XLPRF)

Our C$45.00, US$33.00 and SEK304 per share price objectives for Lundin Mining are based on 11.5x and 11.0x EV/EBITDA multiples applied to our 2026E EBITDA and 2027E EBITDA and 1.0x applied to our net asset value (NAV) estimate. We apply a USDCAD FX rate of 1.42 and a USDSEK FX rate of 9.14. Since 2005, the global base metal producers have traded in an EV/EBITDA range from 2.0x to 13.0x, with Lundin trading at a discount to the average due to it being a smaller company. However, we see potential for a re-rating as LUN executes on its growth strategy including its transformative Vicuña project.

Downside risks to our PO are worse-than-expected economic performance that could impede our metal demand expectations, impacting our commodity price forecasts. In addition, development and/or permitting delays, stronger than forecast local currencies that increase USD costs, worker strike action, several possible technical missteps and weather could also impact our Lundin valuation and PO.

Upside risks are higher-than-forecast commodity prices as well as weakening local currencies, substantial exploration success leading to longer mine lives and/or higher margin ounces, the potential for LUN to become an acquisition target.

Lundin Mining Corp (LUNMF)

Our C$45.00, US$32.00 and SEK304 per share price objectives for Lundin Mining are based on 11.5x and 11.0x EV/EBITDA multiples applied to our 2026E EBITDA and 2027E EBITDA and 1.0x applied to our net asset value (NAV) estimate. We apply a USDCAD FX rate of 1.42 and a USDSEK FX rate of 9.14. Since 2005, the global base metal producers have traded in an EV/EBITDA range from 2.0x to 13.0x, with Lundin trading at a discount to the average due to it being a smaller company. However, we see potential for a re-rating as LUN executes on its growth strategy including its transformative Vicuña project.

Downside risks to our PO are worse-than-expected economic performance that could impede our metal demand expectations, impacting our commodity price forecasts. In addition, development and/or permitting delays, stronger than forecast local currencies that increase USD costs, worker strike action, several possible technical missteps and weather could also impact our Lundin valuation and PO.

Upside risks are higher-than-forecast commodity prices as well as weakening local currencies, substantial exploration success leading to longer mine lives and/or higher margin ounces, the potential for LUN to become an acquisition target.

MP Materials (MP)

Our $85 PO assumes a 25x multiple on our 2029E EBITDA, discounted back to today's money using MP's weighted average cost of capital of around 7.0%. The 25x multiple assigned is below its own historical average (of 34.2x) but in-line with its 2020-2024 average of 25.2x. The higher multiple vs peers recognizes 1) reduced execution risk, 2) expansion potential, 3) rising strategic premium, 4) and explicit Department of Defense (DoD) support. As the only integrated rare earth and magnetics producer in the Western Hemisphere, we continue to see MP as a unique investment vehicle for exposure. We are medium to long-term bullish neodymium-praseodymium (NdPr), MP's key upstream product.

Upside risks: 1) stronger EV and wind generation demand, 2) scarcity of other rare earths investment vehicles, 3) likely first-mover advantage in the vertical integration opportunity, 4) barriers to entry (Stage I and II), 5) potential for additional U.S. government financial support, 6) possible more collaborations with major EV makers, 7) the possibility that MP could be acquired, and 8) higher than expected rare earths pricing.

Downside risks: 1) execution of Stage II and III and cost containment, 2) higher China supply quotas, 3) new entrants, particularly outside of China., 4) increased competition in Stage III, 5) limited clarity on Stage III profitability, 6) rare earth magnet substitutes, and 7) slower EV adoption hurting demand.

Newmont Corporation (NEM / XNCRF)

Our price objective for Newmont is $139 (A$200) per share, and is based on the stock trading at 1.75x times our estimated net asset value (NAV). We assume a USDAUD exchange rate of 1.47. Our NAV is based on a 5% discount rate and a long-term gold price of $3,500/oz. Historically, North American precious metal stocks have traded between 1 and 3 times NAV, with a median of 1.50 times over the past three years (2.00 times longer-term), and with unhedged, growth-oriented producers with solid balance sheets occupying the upper end of the range. In the great gold rally of 2011, NEM's multiple peaked at 2.50x.

Upside risks to our price objective are stronger-than-forecast commodity prices, better than expected success at reducing costs and positive regulatory, permitting or operating developments. Downside risks to our price objective for Newmont are the inability to secure financing for expansion or development projects, unforeseen operating problems, political, legal or permitting challenges in the regions in which the company operates, rising capital and operating costs and delays in the development of its growth projects.

Nexa Resources (NEXA)

We have removed the investment opinion on the company's stock. Investors should no longer rely on our previous opinion or price objective.

Nucor (NUE)

Our price objective of $300 per share is based on 9.0x 2026E EV/EBITDA, 8.5x 2027E EV/EBITDA and 1.0x NAV, with each value equally weighted. The 9x 2026E EV/EBITDA target multiple is above its historical average of 7.3x to reflect potential upside from higher spot pricing and its highly variable cost structure, diversified product mix, strong volume growth potential (from multiple projects underway) and investment grade balance sheet with a disciplined capital return policy (minimum of 40% of net income).

Downside risks to our price objective are: 1) lower steel price and higher scrap costs squeezing margins, 2) weaker than expected demand especially in construction markets, 3) project start-up delays and cost overruns, and 4) M&A's which could be dilutive in the near-term.

Upside risks to our price objective are: 1) higher than expected steel prices, 2) lower than expected input costs, 3) lower import volumes, 4) more favorable trade policies, and 5) a stronger than expected economy.

Pan American Silver (PAAS)

Our price objective for Pan American Silver is $57.00, and is based on the stock trading at 1.75x our estimated net asset value (NAV) on a net investments-adjusted basis (i.e. the 1.75x multiple is applied to the asset value and then the value of the equity investments is added to that with an effective 1.0x multiple applied). Our NAV is based on a 5% discount rate for all assets, except Escobal for which we use 7.5%. Historically, North American precious metal stocks have traded between 1 and 3 times NAV, with silver producers generally trading at a discount to gold producers.

Upside risks to our price objective are higher than expected commodity price forecasts, a change in the regulatory/permitting environment in the Chubut province of Argentina where Pan American's dormant Navidad project is located, operating results that exceed expectations and lower than expected capital costs.

Downside risks to our price objective are unforeseen operating issues, realized commodity prices that are below our forecast, regulatory issues (including tax, environmental and permitting) that cause financial results to differ from our forecast, and higher than expected capital costs.

Reliance, Inc. (RS)

Our $405 per share price objective for Reliance Inc. (RS) is based on 11.5x 2026E EV/EBITDA, 11.0x 2027E EV/EBITDA and 1.0x NAV, with each value equally weighted. The 11.5x 2026E EV/EBITDA target multiple is above its historical trading average of 8.3x to account for improved business model with higher long-term sustainable gross profit margin of 29-31% versus 25-27% in 2015/16 and potential growth through M&A.

Downside risks to our price objective are: 1) a sharp correction in prices (carbon steel, stainless and aluminum), 2) weaker than expected macro, leading to lower metal demand, 3) higher imports and 4) execution risk related its acquisition strategy.

Upside risks to our price objective are: 1) aggressive buybacks or dividend increases, 2) higher metal prices, 3) more attractive consolidation opportunities and 4) a better demand environment.

Royal Gold (RGLD)

Our price objective for Royal Gold is $222 per share, which is based on the stock trading at 2.00x our adjusted net asset value (NAV), valuing net cash cost 1:1. Our net asset value (NAV) is based on a 5% discount rate. Historically, North American precious metal stocks have traded between 1 and 3 times NAV, with unhedged, growth-oriented producers occupying the upper end of the range. Given Royal Gold's status as a royalty company as opposed to an operator, our target valuation multiple reflects its good cash flow-generating ability.

Upside risks to our PO are substantially higher commodity prices, higher-than-expected output at the royalty assets, and/or higher reserves at the royalty assets. Downside risks are a weaker gold price, problems at the operations, and no exploration success.

SSR Mining Inc. (SSRM / YSSRM)

Our price objective for SSR Mining is $40.00 (C$56.00) per share, and is based on 1.25x our adjusted estimated net asset value (NAV). Our NAV is based on a 5% discount rate (consistent with the vast majority of gold operations within our North American precious metals coverage) and long-term gold price forecast of $3,500 per ounce. Historically, North American precious metal stocks have traded between 1 and 3x NAV, with a median of 1.00x over the past three years (2.00x longer-term). Our target multiple reflects the enormous uncertainty surrounding the outcome of the heap leach pad slide at the Copler mine balanced by stronger North American operations.

Upside risks to our price objective are stronger-than-forecast commodity prices, better-than-expected success at reducing costs and positive regulatory, permitting or operating developments.

Downside risks to our price objective for SSR are the inability to secure financing for expansion or development projects, unforeseen operating problems, political, legal or permitting challenges in the regions in which the company operates, rising capital and operating costs and delays in the development of its growth projects.

Steel Dynamics (STLD)

Our $270 per share price objective for Steel Dynamics (STLD) is based on 8.5x 2026E EV/EBITDA, 8.0x 2027E EV/EBITDA and 1.0x NAV, with each value equally weighted. Our 8.5x target EV/EBITDA multiple is higher than its historical trading average of 6.6x to reflect potential upside from higher spot pricing and its industry leading utilization rate, highly variable cost structure, leading value-add product portfolio, investment grade balance sheet and unique exposure to higher margin downstream business via its aluminum rolling mill. At spot pricing, the implied valuation multiple is closer to 8.0x, still high historically.

Upside risks to our price objective are: better than expected macro leading to stronger steel pricing and spreads than we forecast, continued Fabrication tailwind, aggressive shareholder returns, more protective trade policy, and lower imports.

Downside risks to our price objective are: lower steel and metal spreads, project delays, lower than expected demand, higher imports, and excess industry supply.

Teck Resources (YTECK / TECK)

We have removed the investment opinion on the company's stock. Investors should no longer rely on our previous opinion or price objective.

Triple Flag Precious Metals Corp. (YTFPM / TFPM)

Our C$53.00 ($37.00) per share PO for TFPM is based on a target valuation multiple of 2.00x our estimated NAV. The multiple is a slight discount to the senior royalty & streaming peers giving consideration to TFPM's smaller market cap and liquidity, and less diversification by geography, commodity and operator, partly offset by above average margins and attributable GEO production growth. The multiple is at the high end of the range for the gold producer peers given the attractive relative investment characteristics of the royalty & streaming business model (precious metals exposure with insulation from opex and capex inflation and upside from production growth and exploration success.

Our NAV estimate is based on a 5% real discount rate and long-term gold and silver prices of $3,500/oz and $42.00/oz (starting in 2031E).

Downside risks to our PO are: 1) a lack of input the operation of portfolio assets, 2) competition from a growing royalty and streaming sector 3) precious metal price volatility, 4) asset investments in non-investment grade emerging markets, 5) concentrated ownership structure, 6) ramp up delays at development projects.

Upside risks are: 1) higher than expected gold and silver prices, 2) future exploration discoveries and unexpected expansions at mines in the portfolio, 3) a potential acquisition of TFPM.

Wheaton Precious Metals (WPM)

Our price objective for Wheaton is $169.00 per share, and is based on the stock trading at 3.25x times our estimated net asset value (NAV). Our NAV per share is based on a 5 percent discount rate. Historically, North American precious metal stocks have traded between 1 and 3 times NAV, with a median of 2.00 times longer-term (1.50 times in the last three years), and with royalty/streaming companies occupying the upper end of the range.

Risks to our price objective for Wheaton are continued commodity price weakness, unforeseen operating problems at the mines on which its silver streams are based, financing challenges, political or legal challenges in the regions in which the mines operate, and delays in the development of projects for which the company silver streams.

Professional subscribers can read the full metals note here at our new Marketdesk.ai portal. 

Tyler Durden Mon, 10/12/2026 - 13:35
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BofA Bets On Copper And Uranium As Higher Rates Put Gold Under Pressure

Trump Declares Ukraine Energy Ceasefire; Zelensky Says "News To Me" As Russia Attacks Powerplant

US relations with Ukraine are once again spiraling fast, especially following President Trump's 'shock' declaration Saturday while addressing Zelensky's anger at the diesel deal with Russia, "I suggest they get a new leader who can make a deal… And I think it's time for Ukraine to get a new president."

The rebuke had been in response to Zelensky blasting the diesel arrangement as "not fair and not honest" and a "sign of weakness" by Trump, and a "birthday gift" to Putin.

And then on Sunday morning, again to the great surprise of Western allies, Trump announced on social media a new energy ceasefire between Ukraine and Russia - except that Kiev quickly said it knows of no such ceasesfire.

"Effective immediately, there is an ENERGY CEASEFIRE in the War between Russia and Ukraine," Trump wrote on Truth Social. "Both parties have agreed. Do not break it!"

More reported blackouts in Kiev Sunday evening, via AFP.

The last such energy ceasefire attempt announced by Trump was in mid-September, but it didn't hold and in fact collapsed rather quickly after. In reality it never so much as got off the ground, before both sides were back at hammering each other's oil, gas, and electricity infrastructure.

Very soon after this latest announcement by Trump on Sunday, Zelensky told US media that it was "news to me". He said to Axios while reacting to Trump's Truth Social post: "If President Trump negotiated it with Putin, please tell us when the ceasefire begins. We are ready, and we will accept it."

And yet the dilemma for Kiev remains: it is vehemently against a US-Russian diesel deal, but any pause in energy attacks would serve to protect that very deal.

This unusual and very public back-and-forth is happening as the Ukrainian capital has been plunged into darkness:

BLACKOUT leaves parts of Kiev in total darkness Mayor’s urged people to LEAVE city 'temporarily' as capital forced into 'survival mode' https://t.co/nAq2f7CKLp

— RTVisual (@RT_Visual_on_X) October 11, 2026

Zelensky has in follow-up said on X that he was "awaiting details from the American side" - and has also complained that Russia has continued hitting Ukraine's energy sites on Sunday. According to more of the latest from Zelensky:

Volodymyr Zelensky has accused Russia of striking a power plant in Kyiv after Donald Trump announced an "energy ceasefire".

The Ukrainian president says in a post on X that he has briefed Trump on the "brutal Russian strikes that continue unabated". He says earlier "the Russians struck a power plant in Kyiv with a 'shahed' drone, and many districts experienced power outages".

"Later, there were strikes on energy facilities in the Kharkiv region. And all of this happened AFTER the President of the United States made his statement about an energy ceasefire," he says.

His fresh video address:

Today, there was a statement from the President of the United States that an energy ceasefire has been secured. This is good news for everyone – and it is important that it become reality. Unfortunately, Ukrainian skies have been infested with Russian “shaheds” all day today. There have been glide bomb strikes and strikes on our energy infrastructure too. A power plant in Kharkiv was attacked this evening. Overall, this past week alone, the Russians have carried out more than 200 strikes on our electricity generation and transmission facilities in Ukraine, and another 17 strikes this week targeted gas and oil facilities. They have killed more than 150 of our people, and more than 700 people have been wounded. Ukraine has proposed many de-escalatory steps. Putin had one answer to all of them – “nyet.” We do hope that he will finally say something to America, Ukraine, and the entire world that will lead to a real and dignified peace. Ukraine wants peace. The question is whether Russia does. The Armed Forces of Ukraine have received all the appropriate orders. We are awaiting clear details of the dialogue between America and Russia – and we expect Putin to follow through on what President Trump said.

— Volodymyr Zelenskyy / Володимир Зеленський (@ZelenskyyUa) October 11, 2026

Meanwhile Washington still has considerable leverage over Ukraine, putting Zelensky between a rock and a hard place. The Trump White House can always block weapons and funds - something it has previously threatened to do but never pulled the trigger on.

Fresh reporting in Financial Times is already putting specifics on the table to be potentially revoked:

SCOOP @FT: The Trump administration is threatening to stop the PURL procurement system that provides Ukraine with weapons in order to press Kyiv to halt its deep strikes on Russian energy infrastructure, according to officials in Europe. The officials, who received calls from American officials on Saturday and Sunday or were briefed on them, said the US was lobbying European capitals and Kyiv in an attempt to end the attacks on Russian oil refineries. The White House declined to confirm or comment on the calls. w/ @HenryJFoy @ahauslohner https://t.co/0dwv7GovPf

— Christopher Miller (@ChristopherJM) October 11, 2026

American diplomats are said to be currently lobbying ⁠European capitals to pressure Ukraine end ​the attacks on Russian oil refineries:

The message from the ​US included threats to cut off intelligence sharing ​and Purl (the Prioritised Ukraine Requirements List) mechanism for procuring US weapons ‌for ⁠Ukraine, the report added.

One official who was given a message from a Pentagon official stated: "They are calling Kyiv . ... They are calling everyone [in Europe]" in order to lean on them.

* * *

Tyler Durden Sun, 10/11/2026 - 15:00
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Trump Declares Ukraine Energy Ceasefire; Zelensky Says "News To Me" As Russia Attacks Powerplant